

Russians' Expectations from the State Social Policy as an Indicator of Their Risks and Opportunities[†]

Yulia LEZHNINA *

* *National Research University Higher School of Economics and Institute of Sociology of FCTAS RAS, Russian Federation;*
jlezhnina@hse.ru

Abstract: The support of state social initiatives by Russians at the micro level often depends on how well they correspond to citizens' ideas about the priorities of the social policy. In this regard, the correlation of state programs with the expectations of people can ensure their legitimacy and general acceptance. The article, based on the data of the representative national studies, shows that Russians expect active participation of the state in ensuring welfare of the population primarily because of both cultural issues and their inability to solve problems using their own economic resources and social networks.

Keywords: social policy, social contract, social expectations, welfare policy, welfare attitudes, public administration, risks, capabilities

JEL Classification Numbers: I31, I38

1. Introduction

Economic reforms of post-Soviet Russia led to a series of social transformations. Currently, one such required transformation is the reform of the social contract between state and society. The state has always played a key role in the functioning of neo-etacratric [Radaev, Shkaratan, 1992] societies, including Russia's. Over the past decades, it has provided minimal social guarantees to the population and has been delegated to act according to the interests of the macrocommunity, even if such interests have required the government to limit the rights of citizens. However, the current sociocultural dynamics in Russia are witnessing a gradual shift in people's attitudes and values towards the importance of individuals and individuality, the willingness to take responsibility, rationalising actions, and future planning [Готово ли ..., 2010]. At the same time, the social policy system is largely unable to cope with its tasks. Thus, an updated framework of interaction between society and state is imperative to improving Russian social situation. This makes it crucial to understand people's expectations of the state as an actor in the social sphere. Such an understanding would enable a social policy that is not only effective, but also legitimate in the eyes of the people.

Across the world, citizens expect state participation in public life and social support. This mindset is predominantly seen in Europe [Williams, Hill, Davies 1999], where the principles of the so-called welfare state have been implemented, although the scale and priorities of the desired assistance differ from country

to country. Citizens' perceptions of the ideal system of welfare and well-being are studied mainly through their attitude towards general frameworks that govern state activities.

There exists a degree of academic consensus in understanding the factors that influence the perception of social policy. On the one hand, *self-interest* and the conditions of individual persons influence such perceptions [Blekesaune, Quadagno, 2003; Knijn, van Oorschot, 2008]. On the other hand, cultural and *ideological patterns* [Blekesaune, 2013; Edlund, 2006, Hasenfeld, RaVerty, 1989; Groskind, 1994; Jæger, 2006] of society and its specific representatives also play a part.

The importance of individual interests for social policy perception has been confirmed through empirical studies. The literature contends that problems, or risks of dealing with problems, increase support for positive government intervention [see, for example, Hasenfeld, RaVerty, 1989]. However, living conditions and risks are often indirectly interpreted through personal, socioeconomic, and socio-demographic characteristics.

In general, the specificity of a demand for social policy for women is governed by their role as mothers; for certain social and professional groups (based on education, class membership, etc.), by their position in the labour market and instability thereof [Iversen, Soskice, 2001; Rehm, 2011, Edlund, 1999, Svallfors, 1997, Andreb, Heien, 2001; Bean, Papadakis, 1998]; for low income groups, by the risk of a low standard of living [Edlund, 1999, Cook, Barrett, 1992]; and for certain ages, by their requirements during a particular stage of life [Arts, Gelissen, 2001; Baute, Meuleman, Abts, 2018; van Oorschot, Mueleman, 2012]. In some cases, forms of state support, such as healthcare and the pension system, are not subject to the influence of these factors, because all individuals would require them at some point.

Cultural and ideological determinants of attitudes towards social policy are conventionally evaluated through the perception of redistribution, reducing inequalities, and equalising opportunities available to people on an individual and societal level [Andreß, Heien, 2001; Blekesaune, Quadagno, 2003; Finseraas, 2009; Jaeger, 2006; Svallfors, 1997, 2003].

The understanding of a population's expectations by the state in post-communist countries is limited, despite the number of studies in this area [Mason, Kluegel, Wegener 1995; Domanski, Heyns, 1995; Mason, 1995; McDonough 1995; Salmina 2014]. Particularly, the Russian people's relationship with the state is often perceived through stereotypes, such as excessive paternalism, high expectations from authorities, and a preference for equality as nostalgia for the Soviet period. In general, the demand of the population for social policy is described only by a few works [Социальные неравенства ... 2008; Авраимова, 2006]. According to these works, Russians expect the state to maintain its key role in social policy implementation. However, the degree of priorities and preferability (e.g., direct transfers or social institutions) varies among the population. Thus, the actual conditions and the demands of the population from the state and its social policy remain unanswered.

2. Requests for social policy led by cultural attitudes

Key public expectations of future governmental reforms today are associated with economic and social issues (Fig. 1). Hence, the main reforms that Russians count on are social justice and eradication of political corruption (51%), as well as economic reforms for overcoming dependence on oil and gas (42%) and the development of industries such as science, education, and health (37%)¹.

Figure 1. Basic expectations for state policy changes, IS of FCTAS, RAS, 2017, %




The majority of Russians prefer state dominance in the social and economic spheres, especially at strategic facilities such as power stations (76%), oil production (73%), pension funds (73%), schools (72%), higher education (71%), housing management (61%), and banks (52%). Public-private management is preferable to Russians in television (51%), print media (53%), and food production (55%).

Russians also demand active participation of the state as per the extant literature. Indeed, in 2017, the World Value Survey² evaluated the propensity of Russians to believe in the duty of the state to provide for its citizens. The results of the 10-point scale³ survey reveal that Russians, on average, measured at 5 (by median), similar to the residents of Germany, Czech Republic, Poland, Netherlands, and Croatia (Fig. 2). A smaller need for state responsibility for its citizens (4) was characteristic of Austria and Switzerland, and it was higher in Spain (6), Iceland (6), and Georgia (8).


Russians assessed the admissibility of income differences on a 10-point scale⁴ as well, measuring at 6, on average. This was similar to the residents of Germany, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands. The residents of Austria, Croatia, Spain, and the Czech Republic scored lower (6), where those of Poland (8 points) and Georgia (10 points) scored higher. *Thus, the perception towards equality of the population among Russians in general does not differ much in comparison with Europeans.*

Figure 2. The necessary of state responsibility for providing people, WVS, 2017-2018, %




In their request for equality, the Russians are most similar to the citizens of Germany—about one-third of the population in these countries holds that the difference in income should not be large (1–4). At the same time, in Russia, the demand for income differentiation is 2.5 times higher in relation to efforts (Fig. 3). It once again confirms that Russians are not focused on equalisation of incomes.

Figure 3. Attitude towards income inequality, WVS, 2017-2018, %



However, there is some demand for social homogeneity, but within the framework of the social structure. This largely concerns the general opportunities available to the population. For most Russians (54%), an *ideal society* is marked by moderate social stratifications, where a statistical graph can be depicted as an *ellipse* (image 4 in Fig. 4). Twenty per cent of the population is tolerant to inequality; for them, an ideal society takes the shape of a pyramid, with a small number of affluent people at the top, but the majority as poor (image 2). Almost the same share of Russians imagines the ideal society as one where the masses form the middle strata, with a moderate ‘bottom’ and ‘top’ (image 3).

Figure 4. Ideal models of society, IS of FCTAS, RAS, 2018, %



For Moscow and St. Petersburg residents, the ideal form a relatively homogeneous structure (image 4 in Fig. 4), which is not typical: only 42% of their residents prefer such a society, whereas one-third (33%) supports the pyramid structure (image 2 in Fig. 4). Thus, *the Russians accept modest social inequality, although they have no denial of this phenomenon*, as shown above. Moreover, in large settlements that provide the greatest opportunities for success and, thus, attract Russians with high achievement attitudes, preferences for a society of social equality are not the norm.

In general, Russians consider inequality in income (84%), access to medical care (70%), living conditions (64%), access to good jobs (51%), and education (48%) to be the most *painful* for society. The perception of acute social inequalities is homogeneous among the various social groups, with few deviations. Thus, inequality in access to medical services for those under 30 years with relatively good health seems to be less painful (63% with 70–74% for other age groups). The same applies to inequalities in access to jobs those in the 41–50 and over 60 years old group (49% and 46% with 53–57% for the rest), when the issue of employment is either not urgent or the career is at its peak.

In general, Russians partly (44%) believe that the state should prioritise inequality as a social problem higher than poverty, whereas 40% of the population fully agree. In their opinion, the state should ensure that all Russians receive guaranteed income (65%). Thus, *Russians expect a minimum standard of state obligation, guaranteed regardless of any condition, including the general policy of decreasing inequalities*. Painful and ungrounded inequalities exist, but the fight against them compared with poverty is, thus, secondary.

The Russian preference for state intervention is broader than the need for social protection or provision of a minimum social standard. For example, more than 90% of Russians (Table 1) believes that the state should always ensure a decent standard of living for the elderly (98%), universal medical care (97%), fair wages (96%), and equality of opportunities for minor children from families with different incomes (92%). That is, the primary functions of the state are to provide basic humanitarian guarantees (with special attention to the health sector) and an institutional framework for the socioeconomic system. More than

80% of Russians also maintain an expectation for the provision of educational opportunities (89%), housing (88%), work relevant to education (87%), a living standard for the unemployed (82%), and reduction of income gaps (82%).

Table 1. Responsibilities of the state in relation to the population, IS of FCTAS, RAS, 2018, %

	Yes	No
Relevant standard of living to working people after retirement	98	2
Medical help provision to everybody	97	3
Fair wages for all working Russians	96	5
Equal opportunities for children from families with different income	92	8
Education provision for those who needs	89	11
Minimum housing for those who cannot allow it	88	12
Jobs relevant to the professions for those who wants to work	87	13
Transfers exceeding poverty line for unemployed	82	18
Decrease of income gap between poor and rich	82	18
Child care for working parents	81	19
Monthly payment for natural resources used to everyone	79	21


Such an expanded set of population expectations from the state reflects a sense of vulnerability among Russians. It is a clear indicator of the need to renegotiate the 'social contract' between society and state.

Under these conditions, social support model is determined through the active participation of the state, where it solves problems of a wide range of socially vulnerable groups. In this regard, 41% of Russians note that the state should protect all underprivileged groups, and another 39% believes that the state is required to provide targeted assistance to social groups in dire circumstances (unemployed, poor households with minor children, etc.). Only 20% of Russians support minimal state intervention (Fig. 4), whereas 13% only agree to humanitarian functions, that is, when the state provides for citizens with disabilities (elderly, invalids, or orphans). The majority (54%) of Russians believe it necessary to demonstrate humanity, and that those financially successful citizens should assist underprivileged groups. Only 46% believe that all people must chart their own financial success, and that poverty is the result of those who do not expend adequate efforts. These results support the view that authorities must maintain welfare through a social policy of resource redistribution. In general, there is expectation from the state in the social sphere, and the concept of 'social support' has an extended interpretation in modern Russia.

Over the past 12 years, the preferences of Russians regarding the model of social support have somewhat changed. About 80% of the population either in 2006, or in 2014 and 2018, tended towards a broader understanding of socially vulnerable groups: such as individuals in difficult circumstances, including employment, households with minor children suffering from poverty, and all underprivileged groups in high need of assistance. However, during this period, there was an 'overflow' of supporters from the expanded list of social protection recipients to a more moderate one. The share of Russians who supported

broad assistance for all underprivileged and needy groups has decreased from 50% to 41%, whereas the share of those who support targeted assistance increased from 27% to 39% (Fig. 5). This, Russians are beginning to take a more responsible position in determining the range of recipients of social transfers. It is also a reaction to the perception that state resources are limited.

Figure 5. The desired principles of the social protection system, IS of FCTAS, RAS, 2006-2018⁵, %



The key actor in social policy, in the opinion of the population, is not just the state, but the federal centre. Its responsibility to provide public goods from a favourable environment to the retirees decent standard of living seems to be higher than the liabilities of other agents (Table 2). Regional authorities should make a smaller but significant contribution to solving problems of housing provisions (20%) and maintaining a favourable environmental situation (30%), sharing responsibility with local authorities on these issues (20 and 23%, respectively). Russians also expect local authorities to actively participate in helping households and minor children (23%), including the provision of pre-school institutions (33%); employers, in turn, must be guaranteed fair wages (37%) and job security (24%). Russians, to a degree, are ready to bear responsibility for personal security (23%) and obtaining higher education (22%).

Thus, the demand for state intervention in the life of Russians is extremely high. In general, the population is tolerant towards the idea of income inequality, but the current conditions thereof are perceived by Russians as painful for society and, thus, requiring state intervention. The respondents hold the same attitude towards monetary inequalities, such as access to social infrastructure and the labour market. Along with maintaining inequalities within the legitimate corridor, Russians also declare a demand for a basic system of minimum support for socially vulnerable populations. With the current expanded understanding of this category, it is expected that, over time, Russians will correct their views in favour of greater focus and targeting.

The general demand for social policy, supported by cultural attitudes governing the social contract, is homogeneous and can serve as a basis for dialogue between state and society. However, does the situation

on the micro level adjust the population's expectations? How do personal problems and interests affect requests to the state?

Table 2. Responsibility for solving problems, IS of FCTAS, RAS, 2018, %

	Federal authority	Regional authority	Local authority	Personally	Employer	Labour union
Pension provision	87	7	3	1	1	1
Poverty reduction	77	12	7	3	1	1
Fair distribution of goods	75	11	7	4	2	1
Medical help	70	16	12	2	0	0
Secondary education	63	10	13	14	0	0
Higher education	58	12	7	22	1	0
Family and children support	49	18	23	8	1	2
Personal safety	46	9	21	23	1	0
Housing provision	46	20	20	12	1	1
Fair wages	45	10	6	1	37	2
Pre-school infrastructure provision	41	25	33	1	1	1
Favorable ecological situation	39	30	23	8	1	0
Working place provision	37	15	17	5	24	1

3. Personal risks and interests as drivers of expectations from social policy

A little over half the Russians (52%) believe that they, along with their household, cannot survive without state support, whereas only 48% believe to be self-sufficient. Although this ratio has softened in recent years (in 2014, it was equal to 60:40, and in 2006, it was 65:35), the share of those in need of assistance from the state remains dominant. Over the last decade, during which the country faced two significant economic crises, the population has adapted to changing conditions, but still remains dependent on state support due to objectively poor circumstances. Paternalism has also become the social norm for Russians living in small settlements (52–59%; and 47–48% for larger ones), those who have reached 50 years of age (57–76%; and 41–48% for the remaining age cohorts), and households with minor children (54%; with 49% in case of their absence in the household).

Only 17% of the population has no problems⁶ and lives comfortable; in 2006, this indicator was lower: 11%. Russians who are over 60 years (12%), as well as those who have a high dependent load (9%), express this belief less often. However, the share of those facing economic problems has been relatively stable over time (39% and 40% in 2018 and 2006, respectively). *Hence, the necessity of improving financial conditions is relevant for the mass strata of the Russian population.* However, the share of Russians who are apathetic towards improvement of their position because they cannot work towards it

has grown from 13 to 20% in 12 years.

Thus, Russians have been largely unable to cope with socioeconomic problems independently, especially given the lack of resources in social spheres. The efficiency of the state in solving social problems remains low.

The change in various sectors of social policy over the last five years is assessed by Russians as a deterioration than an improvement. The only exception is pre-school childcare institutions, where Russian express a positive view almost two times more often than a negative one. A negative assessment of changes dominates over a positive one in the evaluation of the country's economy as a whole. For secondary and higher education, housing and pension, and work opportunities, the corresponding difference is more than two times. For the healthcare system, it is 4.5 times (tab. 3).

Table 3. The assessment of dynamics in various social spheres over the previous 5 years, IS of FCTAS, RAS, 2018, %

	Became better	No changes	Became worse
Pre-school infrastructure	29	54	17
Economy of the country	26	40	34
Secondary education	15	60	25
Higher education	14	59	27
Housing situation	15	54	31
Pension provision	14	54	32
Opportunities to earn money	16	47	37
Health care	11	42	47

In general, the status of the healthcare system receives the strongest reactions in the social sphere. Only 12% of Russian remain unaffected by the deterioration of medical care (and education), whereas more than half express strong concern (39%) or constant fear (15%). These fears are not baseless, because a significant part of the population already has to use medical services for a charge (44% in the last three years before the survey). In more than half the cases (57%), this is due to a lack of alternative, free healthcare services.

Social networks rarely help in solving problems. More than half (51%) of the population have extremely limited resources of such help. Their friends and relatives are incapable of helping them find jobs or access doctors, for example (Tab. 4). Even the resource to borrow up to \$1,500 is available only to a quarter of Russians.

Over the past three years, Russians' social networks resources have only declined. The capability to solve problems through them has decreased by 1.3–1.8 times. In fact, the potential of using them to access good doctors and hospitals has decreased by 1.7 times. *Thus, today, neither individual economic assets nor social capital acts as 'insurance' for the population of the country, implying the imperfections of the state system of social support.*

Moreover, Russians already claim that some of their problems are a consequence of the social inequalities that have developed in society. After 40 years, Russians have become more sensitive to inequality in access to medical care (50–69%; and 36–48% for younger cohorts). They are more sensitive to physical limitations that hinder comfortable living after 60 years of age (19%; and 5–12% for the rest). Moreover, the importance of inequality in access to good jobs has reduced (13%; and 32–43% for the rest). Due to gender disparities in life expectancy, women suffer from inequality in medical care more often than men do (54% and 47%, respectively). Access to medical care is a key point in the social policy agenda. This type of inequality is considered painful by most (52–54%) throughout Russia, except in Moscow and St. Petersburg (41%), where infrastructure opportunities are very different.

Table 4. Availability of support from acquaintances, friends or relatives for solving problems, IS of FCTAS, RAS, 2015–2018, %

(ordered by 2018, any number of responses allowed)

Problems/ Situations	2015	2018
Necessity to take money as a loan (up to 1 500 dollars)	32	25
Search for additional job income	27	15
Access to good doctors, good hospitals	22	13
Good job enrolment	12	8
Opportunity to take more than 1 500 dollars as a loan	5	6
Children's enrolment to a good school	8	5
Solving housing problem	5	4
Access to authorities with ability to solve problems	5	4
Entering high school/ university	5	3
Career promotion	4	2
No friends like these	24*	51

* In 2015, this answer was formulated as “I find it difficult to answer”

Russians also assess their vulnerability to key types of inequalities⁷ (income, housing, access to medical care and good jobs) far lower than for the whole society. It explains the lack of obvious social tension: Russians consider their personal situations as not critical compared with the ‘larger picture’.


Hence, Russians face problems that they cannot independently address, and thus experience the full impact of existing inequalities. In these conditions, they impose responsibility for their wellbeing on the state.

The request for social policy determined not by the public but by the personal interests of Russians reflects their sensitivity to the personal circumstances and daily risks of various social groups. In general, only 17% of Russians have no need for assistance from the state in solving their problems (Fig. 6).

For Russian, the key aspects to enable the support structure of basic needs include ensuring fair wages

(41%) and mandatory medical care (36%). Economic support (31%), employment (22%), housing provision (19%), and mandatory education (11%) are among other areas relevant to less than one-third of the population. Thus, the most common demands of Russians for an alleviating social policy include institutional and infrastructural opportunities. Issues related to the healthcare system are particularly acute.

Figure 6. The problems of Russians that need governmental support and assistance, IS of FCTAS, RAS, 2018, %
(allowed no more than three answers)



Specificity in the expectations of state social policy is noticeable among the elderly population, especially Russians aged 60 years. Most expect assistance in economic issues (53%) and mandatory medical care (54%), as well as housing, education, and the labour market to a lesser degree. Contrariwise, young people aged 18–30 years believe in the urgent need for fair wages (40–47% for Russians younger than 60 years), state assistance in employment (31%; and 18–23 for others) and housing provision (27%; and 12–23% for others). Representatives of households with minor children more often declare the need for state assistance for education (15%; and 8% for households without children) and housing provision (23%; and 17% for households without children). This specificity by Russians while demanding state support is characteristic of their current lifecycle stage. Thus, through self-realisation and self-assessments, Russians formulate the need for assistance from the state more actively. Lack of other resources for solving social problems of the population also plays a role.

4. Conclusion

The demands of Russian population for state participation in solving its economic and social issues are extremely high, but not higher when compared with the population in European countries. This paternalism does not arise from a ‘dependent culture’, but reflects objective challenges that Russian society faces. These issues include limited access to social infrastructure, poorly functioning institutions, and absence of personal financial resources. At the same time, the social sphere itself faces constant deterioration. The main item on the social agenda, in the opinion of the population, is the implementation of the humanitarian functions of the state, with an emphasis on the health sector and guarantees of institutional stability. In general, Russians show consensus of opinions on the required model of social policy without reference to their own risks and opportunities. This can support the future social contract between state and society.

† This study was conducted through the support of a grant from the Russian Science Foundation №17-78-20125 ‘Behavioral strategies of the population in the post-crisis period: How the new everyday realities of Russians’ life affect the “corridor of opportunities” for the country’s development’. I am grateful to the Joint Usage and Research Center of the Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, for their financial support providing the opportunity to present and discuss this paper.

Notes

- ¹ Unless otherwise indicated, the article provides data of the Monitoring of Institute of Sociology of FCTAS, Russian Academy of Sciences, named ‘Dynamics of the social transformation of modern Russia in socio-economic, political, socio-cultural and ethno-religious contexts’. The sample consisted of 4,000 respondents in each wave representing the adult population of the country aged 18 years by basic socio-demographic indicators. For more information on the sample, see, for example, Российское общество... (2018). Data for 2018 is the eighth wave of monitoring; for 2017, the seventh; and for 2014, the first.
- ² For more information, see <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>. The data of the seventh wave of research were used; the research was conducted in 2017–2018.
- ³ The 10-point scale was built such that 1 point corresponded to the position ‘People themselves should bear more responsibility for supporting themselves’ and 10 points corresponded to ‘The state should bear more responsibility for ensuring that all people are secured’.
- ⁴ The 10-point scale was built such that 1 point corresponded to the position ‘The difference in income should not be very large’, and 10 points corresponded to ‘The one who works more should earn more’.
- ⁵ Data for 2006 are provided according to the study ‘Social Policy and Social Reforms’ by the Institute of Sociology of FCTAS, Russian Academy of Sciences. The sample includes 1,750 respondents representing the adult population of the country aged 18 years by main socio-demographic indicators.

⁶ The survey provided an opportunity to note three out of 18 types of problems (poor financial situation, problems with food, clothing or shoes, housing, work, changes in social status in recent years, health of family members, family, children, inability to get an education, lack of time, attention from other people, the ability to communicate with relatives and friends, the possibility of good quality leisure activities, bad habits [alcoholism, drug addiction, etc.] among family members, insecurity from violence, loneliness) as answer.

⁷ At least half of the population considers them as painful for society as a whole.

References

- Andreß H.-J. and Heien T. (2001) "Four worlds of welfare state attitudes? A comparison of Germany, Norway, and the United States," *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 17, No. 4: 337-356.
- Arts W. and Gelissen J. (2001) "Welfare states, solidarity and justice principles: Does the type really matter?," *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 44, No. 4: 283-299.
- Baute S., Meuleman B. and Abts K. (2018) "Measuring attitudes towards social Europe: A multidimensional approach," *Social Indicators Research*, Vol. 137, No. 1: 353-378.
- Bean C. and Papadakis E. (1998) "A comparison of mass attitudes towards the welfare state in different institutional regimes, 1985-1990," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol. 10, No. 3: 211-236.
- Blekesaune M. (2013) "Economic strain and public support for redistribution: A comparative analysis of 28 European countries," *Journal of Social Policy*, Vol. 42, No. 1: 57-72.
- Blekesaune M. and Quadagno J. (2003) "Public attitudes toward welfare state policies: A comparative analysis of 24 nations," *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 19.
- Cook F. L. and Barrett E. J. (1992) *Support for the American Welfare State: The Views of Congress and the Public*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Domanski H. and Heyns B. (1995) "Toward a theory of the role of the state in market transition: From bargaining to markets in post-communism," *European Journal of Sociology (Archives Européennes de Sociologie)*, Vol. 36.
- Edlund J. (1999) "Trust in government and welfare regimes: Attitudes to redistribution and financial cheating in the USA and Norway," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 35: 341-370.
- Edlund J. (2006) "Trust in the capability of the welfare state and general welfare state support: Sweden 1997-2002," *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 49, No. 4: 395-417.
- Finseraas H. (2009) "Income inequality and demand for redistribution: A multilevel analysis of European public opinion," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1: 94-119.
- Gelissen J. (2002) *Worlds of Welfare, Worlds of Consent?: Public Opinion on the Welfare State*, Publisher: Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drukkerij.
- Groskind F. (1994) "Ideological influences on public support for assistance to poor families," *Social Work*,

- Vol. 39: 81–89.
- Gundelach P. (1994) “National value differences: modernization or institutionalization?,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 35, No.1–2.
- Hasenfeld Y. and RaVerty J. A. (1989) “The determinants of public attitudes toward the welfare state,” *Social Forces*, Vol. 67: 1027–1048.
- Iversen T. and Soskice D. (2001) “An asset theory of social policy preferences,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 4: 875–93.
- Jæger M. M. (2006) “Welfare regimes and attitudes towards redistribution: The regime hypothesis revisited,” *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 22, No. 2: 157–170.
- Knijf T. and van Oorschot W. (2008) “The need for and the societal legitimacy of social investments in children and their families,” *Journal of Family Issues*, Vol. 29, No. 11: 1520–1542.
- Mason D. S. (1995) Attitudes toward the market and political participation in the postcommunist states,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 54, No. 2.
- Mason D. S., Kluegel J. and Wegener B. (1995) *Social Justice and Political Change: Public Opinion in Capitalist and Post-communist States*, New York: A. de Gruyter.
- McDonough P. (1995) “Identities, ideologies and interests: Democratization and the culture of mass politics in Spain and Eastern Europe,” *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 57, No. 3.
- Peillon M. A. (1996) “Qualitative comparative analysis of welfare state legitimacy,” *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 6.
- Radaev V. and Shkaratan O. (1992) “Etacratism: Power and property — Evidence from the Soviet experience,” *International Sociology*, Vol. 7, No. 3.
- Rehm P. (2011) “Social policy by popular demand,” *World Politics*, Vol. 63, No. 2: 271–299.
- Salmina A. (2014) “Social attitudes towards welfare policies in Russia and other European countries,” *International Social Work*, Vol. 57, No. 5.
- Svallfors S. (1997) “Worlds of welfare and attitudes to redistribution: A comparison of eight western nations,” *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 13.
- Svallfors S. (2003) “Welfare regimes and welfare opinions: A comparison of eight western countries,” *Social Indicators Research*, Vol. 64.
- van Oorschot W. and Meuleman B. (2012) “Does popular support for welfare states depend on their outcomes?,” in S. Svallfors ed., *Contested Welfare States: Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press: 25–57.
- Williams T., Hill M. and Davies R. (1999) “Attitudes to the welfare state and the response to reform (A Report of Qualitative and Quantitative Research on Attitudes to the Welfare State and to Proposals for Reform / Research report (Great Britain. Dept. of Social Security)),” Vol. 88, Corporate Document Services.
- Авраамова Е. М. (2006) О пространстве возможностей реформирования социальной сферы, *Общественные науки и современность*, 3.

- Горшков М. К., Крумм Р., Тихонова Н. Е., ред. (2010) Готово ли российское общество к модернизации? М.: Весь Мир.
- Горшков М. К., Петухов В. В., ред. (2018). Российское общество и вызовы времени, Книга шестая. М.: Весь Мир.
- Горшков М. К., Тихонова Н. Е., ред. (2008) Социальные неравенства и социальная политика в современной России, Ин-т социологии Рос. акад. наук. М.: Наука.